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This chapter will address the extent to which
nonhuman animals are conscious. Most important
perhaps is what criteria should be used in making
such a determination. We have certainly come a
long way from the Cartesian view that animals are
mere “automata” and do not even have conscious
experience. In addition to the obvious and signif-
icant behavioral similarities between humans and
many animals, much more is known today about
our neurophysiological and genetic similarities.
Still, there are some grey areas and genuine difﬁ-
culties in interpreting some experimental results
pertaining to animal cognition and in analyzing
the comparative neuroanatomy.
The more general “problem of other minds,”
including the so-called argument by analogy, is
introduced in the section “Animals and the Prob-
lem of Other Minds”. In the section “Lloyd Mor-
gan’s Canon and Parsimony,” “Morgan’s Canon”
and the related principle of simplicity is addressed
especially as they pertain to attributions of animal
consciousness. The section “More on Some Hard
Cases and Brain Structure” focuses on some of the
harder cases, such as ﬁsh and insects, where it is
necessary to delve more deeply into some com-
parative neurophysiology. Finally, in the section
“Animal Consciousness and Higher-Order
Thought Theory,” the charge that one prominent
philosophical theory of consciousness (the
higher-order thought theory) is inconsistent with
animal consciousness is explored. Here the focus
is on the possibility of self-awareness and meta-
cognition in animals.
Philosophical and scientiﬁc work on animal
minds and consciousness has surged in recent
years with the publication of several major studies
and reviews, such as Tye (2016), Andrews and
Beck (2018), Allen-Hermanson (2018), as well as
the recently launched on-line journal Animal Sen-
tience (see, e.g., Harnad 2016, Klein and Barron
2016; see also Allen and Trestman 2016, Andrews
2016). Much of this work takes on the challenge
of the most difﬁcult borderline cases, such as
reptiles, crabs, insects, and ﬁsh, as well as further
examination of the evolution of consciousness.
Perhaps the most commonly used notion of
“conscious” is captured by Thomas Nagel’s
“what it is like” sense (Nagel 1974). When I am
in a conscious mental state, there is “something it
is like” for me to be in that state from the ﬁrst-
person point of view. When I smell a rose or have
a conscious visual experience, there is something
it “seems like” from my perspective. This is pri-
marily the sense of “conscious state” that I use
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throughout this chapter. Ideally, we would like
to know which, and to what extent, animals
are capable of having conscious subjective expe-
riences such as pains, perceptions, and emotions.
As Nagel famously asked, “What is it like to
be a bat?”
Animals and the Problem of Other Minds
It is clear that we have come a long way from the
Cartesian view that animals are mere “automata”
and that animals do not even have conscious
experience. Other major ﬁgures in the early mod-
ern period, such as Leibniz, also struggled with
the question of animal (or “brute” or “beast”)
consciousness (Gennaro 1999). There has indeed
been a long history of philosophical opinion and
argument about animal consciousness (see, e.g.,
Allen and Trestman 2016; Allen-Hermanson
2018). In addition to some clear behavioral simi-
larities between humans and many animals, much
more is known today about other physiological
similarities such as brain and DNA structures.
To be sure, there are also important differences
and some genuinely difﬁcult grey areas where
one might have legitimate doubts about a
given animal and consciousness. Nonetheless, it
seems fair to say that most philosophers today
agree that a signiﬁcant portion of the animal king-
dom is capable of having conscious mental states.
Of course, this is not to say that animals can have
all of the same kinds of sophisticated conscious
states enjoyed by human beings, such as reﬂecting
on philosophical and mathematical problems,
enjoying artworks, or thinking about the vast
universe or the distant past. However, it still
seems reasonable to believe that animals can
have at least some conscious states ranging from
rudimentary pains and emotions to various per-
ceptual states (visual, olfactory, tactile, etc.) and
episodic memory.
One traditional way to approach this topic is
via the “problem of other minds,” that is, how we
can know that others have conscious mental states
especially given the more indirect access we have
to them as compared to our own minds. Although
there is no generally accepted solution to this
problem, most people in practice simply take it
for granted that other human beings have mental
states similar to theirs. However, knowledge of
animal minds does present some particular difﬁ-
culties. Nonhuman animals cannot describe their
mental states using language even though they
can most certainly communicate with each other
(and even to us) in various other ways. Although
there have been attempts to teach human-like lan-
guages to members of other species, none can do
so in a way that would easily solve this problem.
Instead, it would seem that despite the similarities
between our behavior and those of other animals,
any such knowledge of their minds would have to
be less certain than what seems to be much more
immediate knowledge of our own minds. None-
theless, a strong inductive rationale for animal
consciousness seems sufﬁcient to establish a rea-
sonable belief that most animals have conscious
mental states. Sometimes this takes the form of an
“argument by analogy” such that, for example, we
know how we feel when we exhibit the behavior
of someone in fear or in pain and so it seems
reasonable to think that the same conscious states
are present when a dog or chicken displays the
same behavior. This is presumably because we
think of such behaviour as caused by the relevant
conscious state. It is unlikely that we always make
such conscious inferences when we observe ani-
mal behavior; rather, we probably often simply
take it for granted. But this analogical strategy can
be found in well-known philosophers throughout
history (e.g., Locke, Hume, Mill, and Russell.)
One worry about this type of argument is that it
seems to generalize from my own single case,
which would indeed be a rather weak instance of
induction. However, we might instead suppose
that it is an argument from my species to most
individuals of another species (see Perrett 1997).
Of course, the details can vary greatly from spe-
cies to species.
A related line of argument is the so-called
inference to the best explanation (IBE) which
does not necessarily depend on self-observation.
This is because it relies more on the fact that a
successful empirical theory sometimes posits the
existence of things that are not directly observed
(such as electrons) but rather known indirectly by
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way of their observable effects. In a similar fash-
ion, positing conscious states can be the best
explanation of what causes an animal’s observ-
able behavior (Pargetter 1984). IBE (sometimes
called “abduction”) is a version of “hypothesis
testing” which might be formulated via a “likeli-
hood” principle according to which one hypothe-
sis is favored over another if it alone predicts an
observation that would otherwise be unexpected
(Sober 2001; see also Allen-Hermanson 2018;
Melnyk 1994.)
In any case, what evidence might be used to
infer the presence of consciousness in animals?
Although many different criteria have been pro-
posed (e.g., Baars 2005; Seth et al. 2005; Edelman
et al. 2005), most fall under one or more of the
following general headings:
1. Nonverbal or non-vocal behavioral evidence.
2. Ability to use language and/or to
communicate.
3. Ability to learn, solve problems, and be
creative.
4. Similarity of brain structure to humans.
So, for example, rocks and tables display
none of the above criteria and thus we do not
think they are conscious. Trees and plants are
alive but also do not meet any of the above
criteria, for example, they do not jump away or
scream when approached with a chainsaw or
lawnmower. At the other extreme, humans nor-
mally seem to meet all four criteria. However,
when we look at the animal kingdom we ﬁnd
that the evidence is often mixed, at least to some
extent. Some animals may only meet two or three
criteria whereas others might only meet one.What
should we make of these cases? At the least, we
might suppose that the more criteria met the more
likely an animal is conscious even if none of the
above criteria is conclusively necessary or sufﬁ-
cient for having conscious states. Of course, it
may also depend upon the degree to which a
given animal can meet a particular criterion.
Generally speaking, with regard to criterion
(1), we can point to an animal’s behavioral reac-
tion to stimuli or a given bodily movement. If a
dog moves in a way similar to me when someone
steps on my leg, this seems to be some evidence
that the dog is conscious. If mental states cause
bodily movements, then it seems reasonable to
infer that the mental state (pain, suffering) is pre-
sent when the typical bodily effect is observed.
With regard to criterion (2), the ability to use
language and/or to communicate, we obviously
communicate with each other via a common lan-
guage and thus we take for granted that there is
conscious thought behind linguistic utterances.
Unlike most philosophers, however, Dennett
(1991, 1995) seems supportive of the idea that
consciousness requires language in the sense of
“story telling” and thus perhaps only humans are
conscious. The conscious “self” is really only a
kind of narrative that we tell ourselves. But even
though many animals cannot linguistically com-
municatewith us, it is clear that they communicate
with each other, such as in fairly sophisticated
whale, chimp, and bird vocalizations. Treating
the use of human-like language as a necessary
condition for consciousness seems to be an unnec-
essarily high bar to clear.
With regard to criterion (3), the ability to learn,
solve problems, and be creative, the fact that a
human student or an animal can learn from a
teacher or trainer provides some evidence that
they have conscious minds. Conscious working
memory and thought seem necessary for at least
some kinds of learning. Further, if an animal is
able to solve a somewhat novel practical problem,
then it seems that at least some primitive con-
scious thinking is required. Many animals are
able to “ﬁgure out” what to do when confronted
with a challenging or unexpected situation, such
as having to make a tool to acquire some food. In
some cases, there can even be what appears to be a
creative solution to a problem. Humans are clearly
also able to be creative in a number of ways.
Rocks and trees, on the other extreme, do not
learn or solve problems.
Along the same lines, some use “behavioral
versatility” or “stimulus independence” as good
overall evidence in support of animal conscious-
ness (Grifﬁn and Speck 2004; Newen and Bartels
2007). If, for example, an animal adjusts its
behavior appropriately in response to unpredict-
able challenges, it seems more likely that it is
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consciously thinking about its situation than when
it responds uniformly. Fixed and rigid responses
to stimuli seem to indicate a lack of conceptual
representation whereas behavioral versatility indi-
cates an ability to think about a given stimulus and
act in a much more context-dependent fashion.
This sort of capacity seems also to indicate an
ability to learn from prior experience and to
solve problems.
With regard to criterion (4), similarity of brain
structure, we might use comparative neurophysi-
ological evidence to help us to determine animal
consciousness. Avariety of theoretical and empir-
ical arguments have been put forward for the
conclusion that consciousness is shared across
all mammals. For example, Seth et al. (2005)
argue that widespread reentrant activity in the
thalamo-cortical complex involve anatomical sys-
tems that are at minimum shared among all mam-
mals and some non-mammals. In addition, many
animals share with us some rather primitive areas
of the brain, such as the amygdala in the limbic
system, responsible for emotions such as fear.
This is how discovering speciﬁc neural correlates
of consciousness in humans might in turn shed
light on animal consciousness, especially given
our common evolutionary history. To the extent
that animals lack some of the brain structures
responsible for more sophisticated mental capac-
ities in us (such as the prefrontal cortex), it seems
reasonable to suppose that they are not capable of
having these kinds of mental states. However, it
may also be that some mental capacities are real-
ized in different brain areas in other species (I will
return to this line of argument in the section “More
on Some Hard Cases and Brain Structure.”).
Of course, for each of our four criteria, there
always appear to be counterexamples which sug-
gest that the criterion is not by itself sufﬁcient for
consciousness. Present day robots and machines,
just to make this point, are capable of some com-
munication and language use (as well as some
appropriate behavioral responses to stimuli). But
it is unclear that either sufﬁces for robot con-
sciousness, perhaps partly because there is no
common biological history or similarity. Bees,
for example, are well-known to communicate to
other bees about where honey can be found
through a series of rather complicated “dances.”
Perhaps bees are conscious but it is at least not as
obvious as some other animals. The case is per-
haps even weaker for various insects, such as ants,
which nonetheless display “avoidance behavior”
and some intra-species communication that allow
them to survive. Weaker still would be the behav-
ior of bacteria and single-celled organisms where
the behavior in question tends to be rigidly ﬁxed.
There is also nothing remotely like a “brain” in
bacteria and not much of one in some tiny insects.
What about creativity? Deﬁning creativity is dif-
ﬁcult but someone might suppose that spiders
creatively make their rather sophisticated webs
even though spider consciousness is at least not
that clear. Also, we can program computers to
solve chess and mathematical problems but
again this hardly seems to be enough for
consciousness.
It may also be that each of the four criteria is
not necessary for consciousness, depending on
unusual circumstances or one’s metaphysical
views. For example, someone who is paralyzed
and cannot behave or communicate may of course
still be conscious. And perhaps some primitive
organisms can be conscious without being able
to solve problems or be creative at all.
Nonetheless, it seems that one can reach a
reasonable inductive inference in favor of con-
sciousness the more criteria that are met (e.g., in
higher mammals) and a reasonable inductive
inference against consciousness when, say, less
than two criteria are met. It is also very important
to emphasize that satisfying each criterion can
come in very different degrees, for example, com-
pare the behavior of an ape with the behavior of a
lizard. Further, the matter can become very com-
plex even within a single type of organism, such
as ﬁsh (Allen 2013).
In some instances, of course, it may even
be difﬁcult to know whether another human is
conscious, such as in coma cases and in persistent
vegetative states (PVS), both of which also
raise signiﬁcant ethical questions (Farah 2008;
Braddock 2017). However, the existence of some
truly borderline cases does not rule out many
other clearer cases of the presence or absence of
consciousness.
4 Consciousness
Lloyd Morgan’s Canon and Parsimony
Before delving further into some details and spe-
ciﬁc species, let us pause ﬁrst to consider an
important methodological issue. Much has been
made recently over how considerations of “parsi-
mony” or “simplicity” in mental state attributions
to animals should be understood. We should of
course be careful not to anthropomorphize, on the
one hand, but also not to underestimate animal
minds, on the other hand. The often quoted Mor-
gan’s Canon says that “in no case may we inter-
pret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a
higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as
the outcome of the exercise of one which stands
lower in the psychological scale” (Morgan 1894,
p. 53). On the surface, the canon seems to favor
less-sophisticated mental state attributions or even
explanations which only reference the body and
behavior of animals under various conditions.
However, many authors have noted serious
problems with this notion as well as signiﬁcant
ambiguity in the canon itself (Browne 2004;
Allen-Hermanson 2005; Fitzpatrick 2008; Sober
2009, 2012). It is unclear how to interpret Mor-
gan’s Canon and how it relates to the associated
notions of “parsimony” or “simplicity.” For exam-
ple, Browne (2004) explains that Morgan’s Canon
is thus not quite the same as following a law of
parsimony. He recognizes that “it is parsimonious
to explain similar, complex, stimulus-response
patterns by similar psychological mechanisms”
(Browne 2004, p. 648). So when various animals
perform in ways similar to humans on a given
task, “it is unparsimonious to adopt one kind of
lower-level explanation for the animal’s response
on one task and a different kind of lower-level
explanation for the animal’s response on [another]
task” (Browne 2004, pp. 643–644). Browne thus
also seems to have in mind what was discussed
in the section “Animals and the Problem of Other
Minds,” that is, some kind of reasonable analog-
ical or explanatory notion of simplicity. We ought
to attribute mental states to animals (and thus
explain their behavior) when they behave simi-
larly to humans under similar conditions.
Michael Tye echoes much of the above senti-
ment and relies on a kind of argument by analogy
as well as the principle of simplicity (Tye 2016,
Chapter 5). Citing Newton and Reid, he approv-
ingly borrows the slogan that “similar effects pro-
ceed from the same or similar causes.” Indeed, to
assign other causes would be to introduce “super-
ﬂuous causes” and run afoul of something like a
principle of simplicity. With respect to animal
pain, for example, Tye comments that he is “enti-
tled to infer that the feeling of pain causes [a]
behaviour in [animals] too unless I have a defeater
to that inference, that is, a reason to believe that a
causal story is operative in those animals that
cannot be reconciled with the causal story that
adverts to pain” (2016, p. 75). As we shall see,
one potential defeater might be a difference in
neuroanatomy, but Tye ultimately rejects the
notion that the lack of neocortex by itself defeats
the inference to pain attribution to many animals.
More on Some Hard Cases and Brain
Structure
Aside from the obvious academic interest, there
is also the very practical matter of the morality
of animal experimentation and eating animals
(Singer 1990; Jamieson 2018). At the very least,
whether or not an animal can suffer and feel pain
should be taken into account with regard to how
they ought to be treated. Billions of animals are
killed every year for food and used in research.
Many of them are subjected to rather cruel condi-
tions. Of course, some think that even if animals
are conscious in some basic sense, they still do
not deserve moral consideration especially as
compared to humans. Few, if any, researchers
and meat-eaters doubt that virtually all of these
animals can experience pain. Pain, it would seem,
is also a fairly primitive conscious state by com-
parison to most other kinds of mental states (Allen
2004; Shriver 2006, 2018). Still, the function of
pain is not merely to avoid bodily damage; it
can also have an emotional or motivational ele-
ment. Thus, there has been signiﬁcant focus on
basic animal sentience in recent years, especially
with respect to some of the harder cases, such
as ﬁsh, crabs, birds, reptiles, cephalopods, and
various insects (Tye 2016). Signiﬁcant discussion
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of animal neuroanatomy seems particularly
relevant to some of the literature, although behav-
ioral responses to stimuli are inevitably also
relied upon.
Neurological studies of animal pain often start
with the distinction between “nociception” and
pain. Nociception is the capacity to sense poten-
tially damaging noxious stimuli and is one of the
most primitive sensory capacities. Nocioceptors
are linked to nerve endings in the skin, some of
which are associated with initially brief and local-
ized sharp pain and others of which result in
longer-lasting pain. Neurons functionally special-
ized for nociception can even be found in inver-
tebrates such as the medical leech and snails.
Since nociceptors are found in such a wide range
of species and are even functionally effective in
spinally transected animals, their presence in a
species provides little justiﬁcation in inferring
conscious pain experiences. Tye explains that
in humans “the painfulness of pain in humans is
based on activity in two different neural regions:
the somatosensory cortex and the ACC [anterior
cingulate cortex]” (Tye 2016, p. 79). The ACC
is more closely related to the “felt badness” or
“unpleasantness” of pain. It seems that when
the somatosensory cortex is damaged, what
results is still an unpleasant sensation but it is
not really described as “pain” as such. We should
keep in mind, however, there are abnormal human
cases of developmental neuroplasticity (e.g., in
hydroencephaly where there is no neocortex)
such that conscious states seem to be realized in
different than normal neural structures from a very
young age. These are indeed abnormal cases of
neural plasticity in humans, but they do show that
there may be reasons to think that in some animals
“the absence of a neocortex does not in and
of itself entail that cells homologous to those
found in the neocortex are missing too” (Tye
2016, p. 84). Although a lack of neocortex must
be taken into account when examining a given
creature’s ability to have pains and other con-
scious states, Tye does not think that it defeats
the inference to the presence of felt pain
depending upon the extent of behavioral similar-
ity. Interpretation of various experimental
results is a matter of ongoing debate with part
of the problem having to do with knowing the
extent of “neural plasticity” or “multiple
realizability” of a given cortical function.
Let us look more closely at some of the
harder cases:
Evidence from lesions and brain imaging
seems to indicate a key role in human pain for
certain cortical structures, especially the anterior
cingulate, somatosensory, and insular cortices
(Craig 2009). Neuroanatomical factors as well as
physiological changes strongly indicate conscious
pain in mammals (Shriver 2006) and birds
(Calabrese and Woolley 2015). Lesion studies of
mammals and birds strongly suggest serious def-
icits in pain experience (Allen et al. 2005). Even
though there is no neocortex in birds, there are still
certain sorts of constituent and ancient neuron cell
types found in birds that are found in our neocor-
tex (Tye 2016, pp. 122–125). In addition, behav-
ioral indicators of pain as seen, for example, in
farm animals include vocalizations, abnormal
postures and limping, and reductions in activity
(Prunier et al. 2013). Chicken most certainly
actively seek pain relief when forced to live in
overcrowded pens and cages. For example, under
certain crippling conditions, they choose feed
laced with a pain reliever far more often than a
feed without it. Under these circumstances, it
would seem that avoiding pain suggests that a
creature can feel pain and thus is capable of at
least some conscious states.
There is a very lively debate over ﬁsh con-
sciousness and especially about whether ﬁsh can
experience pain, stress, and suffering (see Rose
2002 and Sneddon et al. 2003 for opposing
views). This is particularly relevant in the very
practical context of welfare regulation in commer-
cial and sport-ﬁshing. The term “ﬁsh” is itself
rather ambiguous and does not really correspond
to any clear taxonomic group of creatures. There
is an incredible diversity and number of ﬁsh
groups or species, and so it is particularly difﬁcult
to make generalizations about ﬁsh consciousness
(see Braithwaite 2010; Allen 2013; Brown 2015;
Tye 2016, Chapter 6, for reviews and extensive
treatment). Tuna ﬁsh are, for example, closer to us
in many ways than they are to sharks, and not all
ﬁsh are “cold-blooded.”
Nonetheless, a key issue for ﬁsh (and reptiles
and other animals, for that matter) is the absence
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of a neocortex (Rose 2002; cf. Rose et al. 2014).
Rose (2002) argues that because ﬁsh lack the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), they may not be
bothered by pain or merely have (unconscious)
nociception. Sneddon et al. (2003) disagree and
argue that there is adequate behavioral and phys-
iological evidence for pain in ﬁsh (see also
Chandroo et al. 2004; Sneddon 2011; Balcombe
2016). Trout, for example, have nociceptors but
also respond favorably to painkillers when treated
with noxious stimuli and ﬁsh react to morphine
much as we do. There are numerous articles on
ﬁsh consciousness in the on-line journal Animal
Sentience, including Key (2015, 2016) who
argues that ﬁsh lack the necessary neurocytoarch-
itecture, microcircuitry, and structural connectiv-
ity for the neural processing required for feeling
pain. Numerous commentators, such as Broom
(2016), Seth (2016), Shriver (2016), and Striedter
(2016), reply to Key. Woodruff (2017) reviews
neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and behav-
ioral studies which leads him to the conclusion
that ﬁsh do have neurobiological correlates and
behavioral ﬂexibility of sufﬁcient complexity to
support the hypothesis that they are capable of
phenomenal consciousness.
Tye (2016, Chapter 6) also argues that ﬁsh
can feel pain and have other conscious states.
He argues at great length that a lack of neocortex
is not by itself a defeater for consciousness
in various animals. The overall behavior of ﬁsh,
such as struggling to get away when caught on
a hook, is very similar to the way we would
behave in such circumstances. And since noci-
oceptors transmit signals that generate pain in
humans and other mammals, it seems plausible
to suppose that ﬁsh feel pain too. Behavioral indi-
cations of fear and anxiety in many ﬁsh also seem
to abound and much the same seems true of basic
perceptual consciousness including smell, vision,
hearing, and visual discrimination (Tye 2016,
pp. 107–113). Once again, the best and simplest
explanation of the extensive behavioral similari-
ties between humans and ﬁsh, according to Tye, is
that ﬁsh undergo the same experiences that we do.
A neocortex is also not present in lizards and
reptiles, but Cabanac et al. (2009) present some
evidence that there is felt pleasure and pain in
iguanas. They argue that consciousness is shared
by all amniotes which include all descendants of
the common ancestor of living birds and mam-
mals, such as lizards, snakes, and turtles. Some
interesting behavioral indicators of consciousness
are also discussed, such as “trade-off” behavior
(where, e.g., ﬁsh decrease feeding attempts as
electric shocks are increased until food depriva-
tion increases), navigational detouring (which
requires an animal to pursue a series of non-
rewarding intermediate goals in order to obtain
an ultimate reward), expression of emotion,
expression of sensory pleasure, and emotional
fever (an increase in body temperature in response
to a stressful situation). It does indeed often seem
rather difﬁcult to explain these behaviors entirely
without also attributing consciousness. Reptiles
also show spatial cognitive abilities similar to
those of rats and exhibit learning or behavioral
ﬂexibility in their pursuit of food. Even though
reptiles lack a hippocampus as well as a neocor-
tex, there is some reason to suppose that the
medial cortex in reptiles operates in a similar
way to the hippocampus in mammals (Tye 2016,
pp. 131–133).
One intriguing group of invertebrate animals
that has received signiﬁcant attention with respect
to consciousness is cephalopods, e.g., octopuses,
squids, and cuttleﬁsh. These are clever and large-
brained animals who are well-known for incredi-
ble abilities to camouﬂage themselves and for
ﬂexible hunting strategies. Mather (2008) argues
that cephalopods exhibit many behavioral indica-
tors of consciousness, including complex learning
and spatial memory. The octopus is especially
interesting. They are highly intelligent, very
adept at learning, and display a variety of complex
cognitive abilities (Godfrey-Smith 2013). The
octopus can even escape from a jar by unscrewing
it from the inside. Once again, we must be
careful however. Cephalopod neuroanatomy is
so very different from mammalian architecture
that it may be difﬁcult to be entirely conﬁdent in
attributions of consciousness. For one thing, over
two-thirds of their neurons are located in their
tentacles.
Another group of animals garnering signiﬁcant
attention is arthropods, which includes insects,
crustaceans, spiders, and many other less familiar
animals (Tye 2016, Chapter 8). This is an ancient
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and diverse group of creatures and so, again,
any generalizations should be made with caution.
It is interesting, however, to note that arthropods
were among the earliest animals to evolve com-
plex active bodies and brains capable of control-
ling them (Trestman 2013). So, if one function
of consciousness is to solve problems which arise
due to controling complex bodies (Merker 2005),
consciousness may have evolved very early on
among arthropods. The case for insect sentience
is sometimes also made on the basis of neuroana-
tomical similarity to the mammalian midbrain
(Klein and Barron 2016). Klein and Barron
argue that basic subjective experience is sup-
ported by the integrated midbrain and basal
ganglia structures which are among the oldest
and most highly conserved brain systems in ver-
tebrates. They argue that the insect brain supports
functions analogous to those of the vertebrate
midbrain and hence that insects may also have a
capacity for subjective experience. (Replies to
Klein and Barron can be found in the same 2016
issue of Animal Sentience.)
The fact that honeybees recognize faces even
from unfamiliar perspectives might be suggestive
of mental rotation and visual imagery (Dyer et al.
2005). Jackson and Wilcox (1993) document a
variety of impressive behaviors in jumping spi-
ders, including detouring and other forms of
apparent planning, as well as ﬂexible, context-
sensitive adjustment of predatory behavior to
prey behavior. There are numerous studies on
bees and, for example, pattern recognition, navi-
gation, communication, visual working memory
(Srinivasan 2010), and mood and emotions
(Mendl et al. 2011).
Nocioceptors are missing in virtually all
insects, but they still do respond to and learn
to avoid a range of noxious stimuli, including
honeybees. Still, it does seem that a stronger
behavioral case can be made against insect con-
sciousness since, for example, they do not move
to protect injured body parts in the way that mam-
mals do. Perhaps, however, some of these behav-
iors can be explained away as attempts to survive
in spite of the pain. In the case of bees, there are at
least some important physiological similarities
and further evidence of intelligence and working
memory (Tye 2016, pp. 148–156). As was brieﬂy
mentioned in the section “Animals and the Prob-
lem of Other Minds,” bees are also well-known
for their very sophisticated navigational abilities
and intra-species communication via “waggle
dances” with respect to the location of food.
Crabs are crustaceans with a highly developed
sense of smell but poor vision. Elwood and
Appel (2009) seem to show that hermit crabs can
remember an aversive event (an electric shock)
and can use that memory in later context-sensitive
decision-making (see also Elwood et al. 2009).
This seems to be evidence of remembering a pain-
ful experience. Crabs also react to analgesics in
the same way that honeybees do. If crabs feel
pain, then surely bees also do since bees have
ten times more neurons than crabs have. Indeed,
bee brain density is ten times greater than a mam-
malian cerebral cortex (Tye 2016, pp. 156–158).
In some of the above cases, there are clearly
some potential “defeaters” (as Tye calls them) to
the conclusion that there really are conscious
states in some species. It may indeed even be
impossible to infer with any sense of conﬁdence,
especially with respect to some insects and crus-
taceans. Still, as we have seen, there may also be
cases where a potential defeater might itself be
defeated, such as in some instances where a crea-
ture lacks a neocortex. In addition, many kinds of
creatures, such as ﬁsh and insects, come with an
incredible variety of species and so there may be
some exceptions which make generalizations dif-
ﬁcult to justify.
Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) take a more
explicitly evolutionary approach to animal con-
sciousness although some of the same issues
raised above are front and center (see also
Godfrey-Smith 2018). When did consciousness
ﬁrst appear on Earth and how did it evolve?
What constitutes consciousness and which ani-
mals are sentient? Using their own list of the
neurobiological features that seem responsible
for consciousness, Feinberg and Mallatt argue
that consciousness appeared much earlier in evo-
lutionary history than is commonly assumed.
About 520–560 million years ago, they explain,
the great “Cambrian explosion” of animal diver-
sity produced the ﬁrst complex brains, which were
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accompanied by the ﬁrst appearance of conscious-
ness. Simple reﬂexive behaviors evolved into a
uniﬁed inner world of subjective experiences.
From this they deduce that all vertebrates are and
have always been conscious, including ﬁsh, rep-
tiles, amphibians, and birds. Considering inverte-
brates, they ﬁnd that arthropods (including insects
and probably crustaceans) and cephalopods
(including the octopus) also meet many of the
criteria for consciousness. Part of this still contro-
versial issue is whether or not consciousness
evolved as an adaptive function and then
remained as a beneﬁt for organisms (Maley and
Piccinini 2018). For example, consciousness may
allow organisms to construct an internal model of
the world, learn in certain ways, or perform vol-
untary actions. If this is so, then consciousness
confers an adaptive advantage to organisms that
have it.
Animal Consciousness and Higher-Order
Thought Theory
It is sometimes alleged that one prominent philo-
sophical theory of consciousness, the higher-order
thought (HOT) theory, is inconsistent with animal
consciousness (Seager 2004). Indeed, one higher-
order theorist has even embraced the normally
unwelcome conclusion that most animals do not
have conscious states (Carruthers 2000, 2005).
Others have responded by defending HOT theory
as consistent with most animal consciousness
(Gennaro 2009, 2012, Chapter 8).
Let us back up: HOT theory is an example of
a so-called representational theory of conscious-
ness which attempt to reduce consciousness to
“mental representations” rather than directly to
neural states. The notion of “reduction” at work
is to explain conscious states by means of non-
conscious mental states and thus without refer-
ence to consciousness (thereby also avoiding
the charge of circularity). Other representational
theories include ﬁrst-order representationalism
(FOR) which aim to explain conscious experience
primarily in terms of world-directed (or ﬁrst-
order) intentional states (Tye 2000). Higher-
order representationalism (HOR) holds that what
makes a mental state M conscious is that it is the
object of some kind of higher-order mental state
directed at M (Lycan 2001; Rosenthal 2005;
Gennaro 2012). There are various kinds of HOR
theory with the most common division between
higher-order thought (HOT) theories and higher-
order perception (HOP) theories. HOT theorists,
such as Rosenthal (1997, 2004, 2005) and
Gennaro (1996, 2012), think it is better to under-
stand the HOR as a thought containing concepts.
HOTs are treated as cognitive states involving
some kind of conceptual component. A HOT is a
“meta-psychological” or “metacognitive” state,
that is, a mental state directed at another mental
state (“I am in mental state M”). HOP theorists
urge that the HOR is a perceptual state which does
not require the conceptual content invoked by
HOT theorists (Lycan 1996, 2004).
So HOR theories attempt to reduce conscious-
ness in mentalistic terms, such as “thoughts” and
“awareness,” rather than directly in neurophysio-
logical terms. Thus, the idea is to reduce con-
sciousness to mental representations. The notion
of a “representation” is of course very general and
can be applied to pictures and various natural
objects, such as the rings inside a tree. Much of
what goes on in the brain might also be under-
stood in a representational way. For example,
mental events represent outer objects partly
because they are caused by such objects in
cases of veridical visual perception. Philosophers
often call such mental states “intentional states”
which have representational content, that is, men-
tal states are “directed at” something such as a
thought about a horse or a perception of a tree.
Any theory of consciousness should seek to
answer the question: What makes a mental state
a conscious mental state? The HOT theorist will
point out that conscious states, as opposed to
unconscious ones, are intuitively mental states
that I am “aware of” being in. This overall idea
is sometimes referred to as the Transitivity Prin-
ciple (TP): A conscious state is a state whose
subject is, in some way, aware of being in it.
Conversely, the idea that I could be having a
conscious state while totally unaware of being in
that state seems like a contradiction. A mental
state of which the subject is completely unaware
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is clearly an unconscious state. For example,
I would not be aware of having a subliminal
perception and so it is unconscious.
It might seem that HOT theory results in circu-
larity by deﬁning consciousness in terms of HOTs
(since HOTs can be thought of as a kind of higher-
order “awareness” of mental states, as in TP).
It also might seem that an inﬁnite regress results
because a conscious mental state must be accom-
panied by a HOT, which, in turn, must be accom-
panied by another HOT ad inﬁnitum. However,
the widely accepted reply is that when a conscious
mental state is a ﬁrst-order world-directed con-
scious state, the higher-order thought (HOT) is
not itself conscious. But when the HOT is itself
conscious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-
order) thought directed at the second-order state.
In this case, we have introspectionwhich involves
a conscious HOT directed at an inner mental state.
When one introspects, one’s attention is directed
back into one’s mind. For example, what makes
my desire to write a good chapter a conscious ﬁrst-
order desire is that there is an unconscious HOT
directed at the desire. In this case, my conscious
focus is directed outward at my chapter or com-
puter screen and so I am not consciously aware of
having the HOT from the ﬁrst-person point of
view. When I introspect that desire, however,
I then have a conscious HOT (accompanied by a
yet higher, third-order, HOT) directed at the desire
itself. It is thus crucial to distinguish ﬁrst-order
conscious states (with unconscious HOTs) from
introspective states (with conscious HOTs).
In any case, it may seem unlikely that animals
(and even infants) have the conceptual sophistica-
tion required for HOTs, which would then render
animal (and infant) consciousness very unlikely
(Seager 2004). Are cats and pigs capable of hav-
ing complex higher-order thoughts such as “I am
in mental state M”?
In reply, however, it may be that HOTs need
not be as sophisticated as it might initially appear
and, in recent years, some experiments have also
strongly suggested that many animals can have
metacognitive states. A number of key areas are
under continuing investigation including animal
memory and uncertainty monitoring. The term
“I-thoughts” is also often used in the literature to
mean “thoughts about one’s own mental states or
oneself.” Thus, they are very similar to HOTs and
closely linked to what psychologists call “meta-
cognition,” that is, mental states about mental
states, or “cognitions” about other mental repre-
sentations (Koriat 2007; Beran et al. 2012).
Although some still reject the notion that most
nonhuman animals have I-thoughts, the evidence
seems to be growing that many animals do in fact
have them and may even be able to understand the
mental states of others (Terrace and Metcalfe
2005; Hurley and Nudds 2006; DeGrazia 2009).
One area of inquiry has to do with episodic
memory (EM) which is an explicitly conscious
kind of remembering involving “mental time
travel” (Tulving 1983, 2005). It is often contrasted
with semantic memory, which need only involve
knowing that a given fact is true or what a partic-
ular object is, and procedural memory, whereby
memory of various learned skills is retained.
Some notion of “I” or self-concept seems neces-
sary to have a genuine EM. I recognize an EM as
mine and as representing an event in my past. To
give an example from animal cognition research,
Clayton and Dickinson and their colleagues report
convincing demonstrations of memory for time in
scrub jays (Clayton et al. 2003). Scrub jays are
food-caching birds, and when they have food they
cannot eat, they hide it and recover it later.
Because some of the food is preferred but perish-
able (such as crickets), it must be eaten within a
few days, while other food (such as nuts) is
less preferred but does not perish as quickly. In
cleverly designed experiments using these facts,
scrub jays are shown, even days after caching, to
know not only what kind of food was where but
also when they had cached it (see also Clayton
et al. 2006). Although still somewhat controver-
sial, these experimental results at least seem to
show that scrub jays have some episodic memory
which involves a sense of self over time. This
strongly suggests that the birds have some degree
of metacognition with a self-concept (or “I-
concept”) which can ﬁgure into HOTs. Further,
many crows and scrub jays return alone to caches
they had hidden in the presence of others and
recache them in new places (Emery and Clayton
2001). This suggests that they know that others
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know (or at least “see”) where the food is cached,
and thus, to avoid having their food stolen, they
recache the food. This strongly suggests that these
birds can even have some mental concepts
directed at other minds, which is sometimes
called “mindreading.” Of course, there are many
different experiments aimed at determining
the metacognitive abilities of various animals
so it can sometimes be difﬁcult to generalize
across species.
There is also the much-discussed work on
uncertainty monitoring with animals such as mon-
keys and dolphins (Smith et al. 2003; Smith
2005). For example, a dolphin is trained in a
perceptual discrimination task, ﬁrst learning to
identify a particular sound at a ﬁxed frequency
(the “sample” sound). The dolphin later learns to
match other sounds to the sample sound. When
presented with a sound that is either the same or
different in pitch as the sample sound, the dolphin
has to respond in one way if it is the same pitch
(such as by pressing one paddle) and another way
if it is a different pitch (pressing another paddle).
Eventually the dolphin is introduced into a test
environment and forced to make extremely difﬁ-
cult discriminations. To test for the capacity to
take advantage of his own uncertainty, the dolphin
is presented with a third “uncertain” response, the
Escape paddle, which yields a greater reward than
an incorrect response but a lesser reward than a
correct response. The dolphin chooses the Escape
paddle with a similar response pattern to humans
and rhesus monkeys which suggest that the dol-
phin is aware of his state of uncertainty, that is,
he has some knowledge of his own mental state.
This is clearly a metacognitive state: the dolphin is
aware that he does not know something, namely,
whether or not a sound matches (or is very close
to) the sample sound. Nonetheless, some authors
(Carruthers 2008, 2009) argue that these and other
experiments do not force us to infer the presence
of metacognition, but one might respond in a
manner similar to the section “Lloyd Morgan’s
Canon and Parsimony” above. That is, it is argu-
ably more parsimonious in some circumstances to
attribute metacognitive states to animals rather
than mere ﬁrst-order states or no conscious mental
states at all accompanied by a far more elaborate
explanation of the animal’s behavior (see also
Gennaro 2012, Chapter 8, for some discussion).
Some authors (e.g., Carruthers 2000, 2005,
2009) cite experimental work suggesting that,
say, even chimps lack the ability to attribute men-
tal states to others (Povinelli 2000). These exper-
iments are designed to determine if chimps take
notice of when an experimenter is looking at
something (say, food) or is unable to see some-
thing (for example, due to blindfolding). Chimps
were just as likely to ask for food from an exper-
imenter with a bucket over her head as from one
who could see which seems to indicate a lack of
the mental concept “seeing” or “visual percep-
tion.” Carruthers further argues that animals with
HOTs should also be able to have thoughts about
the mental states of other creatures. However, it is
not at all clear that having I-thoughts requires
being able to read other minds and, in any case,
the evidence seems to be growing that many ani-
mals can mindread. For example, Laurie Santos
and colleagues show that rhesus monkeys attri-
bute visual and auditory perceptions to others in
competitive paradigms (Flombaum and Santos
2005; Santos et al. 2006). Rhesus monkeys pref-
erentially attempt to obtain food silently only in
those conditions where silence was relevant to
obtaining the food undetected. While a human
competitor was looking away, monkeys would
take grapes from a silent container, thus appar-
ently understanding that their human competitors
would hear the noise otherwise. Subjects reliably
picked the container that did not alert the experi-
menter that a grape was being removed. This
suggests that monkeys take into account how
auditory information can change the cognitive
state of the experimenter. As we saw in the section
“Lloyd Morgan’s Canon and Parsimony,” parsi-
mony would seem, at least at times, to be on the
side of such mental state attributions.
I lack the space here to delve further into this
massive literature but for much more on the issue
of mindreading and metacognition in animals and
infants, see Carruthers (2009), Nichols and Stich
(2003), Goldman (2006), Lurz (2011), and
Gennaro (2012, Chapters 7 and 8). Goldman
(2006) defends the view that self-attribution of
mental states (metacognition) is prior to our
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capacity to attribute mental states to others
(mindreading). A more modest view, offered by
Nichols and Stich (2003), is that the two capaci-
ties are independent and dissociable. Carruthers
(2009) argues that mindreading is actually prior
to metacognition. The two main much discussed
views are simulation theory (ST) and theory-
theory (TT). ST holds that mindreading involves
the ability to imaginatively take the perspective of
another. TT holds that metacognition results from
one’s “theory of mind” being directed at oneself.
Still, many existing theories are in fact hybrids of
ST and TT.
Of course, it may be that HOT theory rules out
more animal consciousness than some other the-
ories, but it arguably does not rule out most animal
consciousness. Perhaps insects and crustaceans
are less likely to be conscious according to HOT
theory, but it may depend on some speciﬁcs. Not
all birds behave in the same sophisticated way that
scrub jays do but it seems reasonable to suppose
that many other birds are also capable of having
at least some HOTs. Other animals mentioned
above, such as monkeys and dolphins, are no
doubt far more sophisticated than insects. Much
the same holds for dogs, lions, pigs, and other
mammals. Some of the behavior of, say, bees
and ﬁsh might arguably even justify the attribu-
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